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INCOMMENSURABILITY, WELFARE
ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW
RICHARD CRASWELLt
In the philosophical literature on values and practical reason, a
debate has arisen over the thesis that certain goods or values are in-
commensurable.' This raises an obvious question for legal scholars:
Would this thesis, if true, have implications for the law? Several
authors have claimed that it would, by challenging various economic
justifications for legal decisions.2
One purpose of this Article is to argue against that claim. To
make this argument, though, a good deal of clarifying work is re-
quired. Economic arguments can be criticized on many different
grounds, but each criticism rests on a slightly different footing, and
many have little to do with incommensurability. Thus, a second pur-
pose of this Article-and perhaps the more important one-is to try
to clarify the various arguments.
The need for clarification stems partly from the differing aims of
philosophers and economists. Some of the philosophical writings on
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incommensurability aim to develop a descriptive account of individ-
ual choice, arguing (in particular) that choices are not adequately de-
scribed as if the individual picked whichever option ranked highest in
some single value. Much of this literature also aims to develop a the-
ory of practical reason or rational action-that is, a theory of how in-
dividual choices ought to be made-, arguing that individuals should
not pick whichever option ranks highest in some single value. But
both of these aims concern individual choice: neither directly ad-
dresses questions about how government decisions ought to be made.
And on the other side of the divide, welfare economists-who do
purport to be addressing government decisions-have not always
been very clear what they assume regarding individual choice. As a
result, in many discussions of incommensurability and law, the par-
ticipants end up talking past one another, and the issues are never
truly joined.
My interest in this Article concerns the proper bases for govern-
ment decisions, or for the law. Thus, for most of the Article I assume
that the theories of incommensurability are correct, as far as individ-
ual decisions are concerned, in order to trace out the possible impli-
cations for government. Part I of the Article explains more precisely
what I mean by incommensurability, and Part II clarifies what I take
to be the presuppositions of welfare economics. The bulk of my ar-
gument, however, appears in two main substantive sections.
Part III begins by asking what would follow from the incommen-
surability of values in an admittedly unrealistic scenario, in which only
a single individual would be affected by some government decision.
Few legal decisions fit this extreme assumption, but in untangling the
possible consequences of incommensurability, I find it a useful heu-
ristic to consider which consequences might apply even in so extreme
a case. Part IV then turns to the more realistic case of a decision that
affects different individuals in different ways. In such a case, main-
stream welfare economics already recognizes one form of incommen-
surability involving interpersonal comparisons of utility, but this has
not been the focus of the philosophical writings on the incommen-
surability of goods or values. Thus, most of Part IV considers meth-
ods of interpersonal comparison that are sometimes used by econo-
mists, such as the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, and the possible alternatives
that might be required by various theories of incommensurability. I
conclude that most of these alternatives are either unsound or have





As many have noted, there is no standard definition of "incom-
mensurability."3 For purposes of this Article, I take the claim that two
options are incommensurable as a claim about the possible justifica-
tions for choosing one option over the other. More precisely, I take
incommensurability to mean that there is no scale or metric that (1)
would satisfy the property of completeness, meaning that one of the
options must rank higher on the scale or they must both rank exactly
equal; and (2) would justify the choice of whichever option ranked
higher.
I focus on justifications for decisions because this is when incom-
mensurability becomes important for the law (as well as for welfare
economics). It is one thing to ask, in the abstract, whether a beautiful
mountain gorge can meaningfully be valued on the same scale that
we use to value cheaper electricity. But this question has the most
bite when the law for some reason must choose between these val-
ues-for example, if there is a proposal to build a dam that would
flood the gorge. Welfare economics purports to offer a basis for
evaluating that decision and for justifying one choice rather than the
other. My interest in incommensurability, therefore, is in the extent
to which it undermines this justification.4
My focus on justifications will force me to consider ethical or po-
litical questions about what counts as a legitimate justification for
government action. But any discussion of incommensurability must
implicitly raise such questions, for any two goods can always be
ranked on some scale. That is, the mountain gorge and cheaper elec-
tricity can clearly be ranked on arbitrary scales such as alphabetical
order or, to use Ruth Chang's example, "pleasingness to my grand-
mother."5 In my terms, though, a claim that two options are incom-
mensurable must be a claim that they are incommensurable for some
S See, e.g., Chang, supra note 1, at 1-2. The definition I use here is close to that
which Chang (and others) refers to as "incomparability," but my definition includes
cases that Chang would describe as lacking any "covering value" with respect to which
comparability could be assessed. Id at 8. A similar definition is used by RICHARDSON,
supra note 1, at 104-05.
' Because my focus is on justification, I have little to say about the purely predic-
tive uses of economics, except for a brief discussion infra at Part II.B. I therefore do
not address many of the criticisms raised by Nussbaum, supra note 2, or Warner, supra
note 2.
" Chang, supra note 1, at 6.
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particular purpose: it is a claim that some particular decision cannot be
justified by ranking the options along any single metric.
6 Thus, the
reason arbitrary scales cannot supply commensurability is because
they are irrelevant to any decision about building the dam. Whether
the criteria of welfare economics are similarly irrelevant will be taken
up below.
Notice, too, that the problem with arbitrary scales is not simply
that they provide an inaccurate description of the goods involved, or
that their description is inadequate or incomplete. After all, every
description will be incomplete in some respect, so the completeness
or adequacy of a description can only really be judged by reference to
the purpose for which the description will be used. In this Article, I
am interested in the purpose ofjustifying government decisions, so I
view descriptive inadequacy as a problem when (but only to the ex-
tent that) it undermines some justification for a government decision.
To see whether any particular inadequacy is a problem, the justifica-
tion that is purportedly undermined by it will have to be spelled out
explicitly.
B. Commodqication
My definition of incommensurability is meant to distinguish it
from the related issue of commodification. I take commodification to
be a concern over one possible effect of describing or justifying
choices as if they were commensurable-and, also, one possible effect
of adopting certain legal rules, such as allowing babies to be sold for
money. Specifically, the concern is that justifying choices in this way
(or permitting people to take certain actions) could alter the way that
people view the goods themselves, and this effect could be undesir-
able. For example, if babies regularly are bought and sold, this could
lead people to think of babies as nothing more than financial assets.
Or if hydroelectric dams are justified using the criteria of welfare
6 Chang makes a similar point when she notes that incommensurability (or in her
terms, "incomparability") can be assessed only with respect to some "covering value."
Id. at 7.
' Cass Sunstein defines incommensurability so as to treat two goods as incommen-
surable if the only metrics along which they could be ranked would not fully reflect
"our considered judgments about how these goods are best characterized." Sunstein,
supra note 2, at 796 (emphasis omitted); see also Pildes & Anderson, supra note 2, at
2176 n.136 ("All attempts to represent people's values in terms of preference rankings
alone, however, leave out much of importance.... [A] full understanding and assess-
ment of people's values requires knowledge of the reasons behind their rankings and
of the way in which people interpret the significance of the outcomes ranked.").
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economics, this could cause people to lose their reverence for na-
ture.
8
In this Article, I do not address criticisms of welfare economics
that are based on commodification. These criticisms raise empirical
questions about cognitive and social psychology, and while these are
clearly topics of importance, they are also topics on which I have little
to say." Moreover, the answer to these empirical questions need not
depend in any way on the normative question that is my focus here-
that is, whether welfare economics provides a metric or scale that is
an acceptable justification for public decisions. After all, even if wel-
fare economics supplies a normatively acceptable justification, its use
might still produce undesirable psychological consequences (which
could then provide a different reason for objecting to its use). Con-
versely, even if welfare economics does not supply a normatively ac-
ceptable justification, this does not establish that its use also would
produce undesirable psychological consequences. In short, there are
some issues of justification that are logically independent from the
question of psychological consequences, and these independentjusti-
ficatory issues will be my focus here.
II. THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF WELFARE ECONOMICS
As noted earlier, most of the philosophical literature on incom-
mensurability has focused on individual choice. For example, if the
individual must choose between a career as a lawyer and a career as a
philosopher, a claim that these two options are incommensurable is a
claim that there is no single scale that would both: (1) rank the ca-
reer as a lawyer either higher or lower than the career as a philoso-
pher; and (2) count as an acceptable normative reason for choosing
the higher-ranking career.
It is important to note that, according to most accounts of in-
commensurability, the lack of such a scale would not prevent the in-
For useful discussions of commodification generally, see MARGARETJANE RADIN,
CONTESTED COMMODMES (1996), and MargaretJane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). Sunstein links commodification to incommensurability
when he speaks of the fear that "a single metric, nominally descriptive of experience,
would actually transform it, in a way that would make a great deal of difference." Sun-
stein, supra note 2, at 797. As this example suggests, concerns about incommensur-
ability are often intermingled with concerns about commodification.
" I do, however, touch on these issues briefly in Part III.E.
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dividual herself from choosing between the two options.'
0 That is, few
if any writers argue that an individual faced with a choice between in-
commensurable options is therefore paralyzed, unable to make any
decision at all (like Buridan's ass). Instead, the incommensurabilist's
claim is a claim about the possible justifications for whatever choice
the individual eventually makes. Specifically, it is the negative claim
that the justification for that choice cannot be found in any scale that
ranks one career higher than the other.
A. Individual Utility Functions
We must now consider what implications this claim would have
for welfare economics. My thesis here-and I do not believe this to
be controversial-is that welfare economics is entirely consistent with
this concept of incommensurability. That is, welfare economics
(properly understood) does not presuppose anything about the pos-
sible justifications for an individual's choice.
This claim may seem implausible to those who equate welfare
economics with some form of utilitarianism. After all, welfare eco-
nomics does speak of individuals' utility functions, as if every option
the individual might choose could be assigned some measure of util-
ity. In welfare economics, however-unlike in classical utilitarian-
ism-a higher ranking in some measure of utility is not what justifies
the individual's choice. Instead, the higher ranking in utility is simply
a mathematically convenient way of describing the individual's choice.
That is, when a welfare economist says that option x gives the individ-
ual more utility than option y, this is best understood as simply assert-
ing that, if the individual were faced with a choice between those two
options, she would-for some as yet unspecified reason-choose x.
As Bengt Hansson has put it, "[o]n this view, utilities can never form a
reason why someone makes a choice, but are rather to be construed as
a way of describing a set of given choices."" And since commensurabil-
ity (as I define it) is present only if there is some scale capable ofjusti-
fying a choice between the options, utility functions of this sort are
perfectly consistent with the absence of commensurability. That is, a
'0 This is clearly true of ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 59-64, and Sunstein, supra note
2, at 810-12. For a survey of other authors, see Chang, supra note 1, at 11-13 & 258 nn.
21-23.
" Bengt Hansson, The Decision Game-The Conceptualisation of Risk and Utility, in
ETHIcs: FOUNDATIONS, PROBLEMS, AND APPLICATIONS 187, 188 (Edgar Morscher &
Rudolf Stranzinger eds., 1981), quoted in RICHARDSON, supra note 1, at 95.
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utility function is entirely consistent with the possibility that there is
no single scale or ranking that would justify the choice described by
the function.2
Another way to see this is to note that the utility functions used by
welfare economics do not place any restrictions on the individual's
reasons for choosing one option over another. Even on so simple a
matter as choosing ice cream, the individual may have to weigh or
balance many different kinds of conflicting values (taste, calories, so-
cial appropriateness, and so on) .3 To be sure, utility theory does
place some restrictions on the choices themselves-transitivity, com-
pleteness, and the independence of irrelevant alternatives-but it
does not place any restriction on the reasons an individual might
have for making an otherwise permissible choice. Thus, welfare eco-
nomics does not require that the choices that are reflected in utility
functions be based only on "wants and not ethical concerns,"
14 or that
the choices must take "exclusively appropriated goods as their basic
object,"'5 or that individuals must adopt "an egoistic, commodity fet-
ishist orientation to their choices."' Nor does it assume that indi-
viduals' goals "are hard-wired by exogenously given tastes,"
7 or that
goals "cannot themselves be the subject of rational deliberation."
8
Nor does it imply that the result, from the individual's perspective, is
"a flat uniform landscape of value, with no jagged promontories or
deep valleys," and with "few motivations for moving here rather than
there on that landscape."' 9
Of course, if the utility functions used by welfare economics do
not presuppose anything about an individual's reasons for choosing
one option over another, they also cannot convey any information
12 This point has been made by any number of authors, including ANDERSON, su-
pra note 1, at 72; HURLEY, supra note 1, at 59; RICHARDSON, supra note 1, at 95-103; and
Jean Hampton, The Failure of Expected Utility Theory as a Theory of Reason, 10 ECON. &
PHIL. 195, 207-10 (1994).
's For attempts to model these different dimensions formally, see, for example,
Kelvin J. Lancaster, A New Approach to Consumer Theory, 74J. POL. ECON. 132 (1966),
and GeorgeJ. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON.
REV. 76 (1977).
14 ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 200.
'5 id at 166.
16 Id. at 199; see also id. at 145 ("Every extension of the market thus represents an
extension of the domain of egoism, where each party defines and satisfies her interests
independent of the other.").
17 Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 1207.
'8 Id. at 1197-98.
19 NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 117.
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about those reasons. Instead, the utility functions simply report the
outcome or result of whatever choice the individual would make,
without trying to report anything about the reasons that might justify
that outcome. Indeed, for most purposes of welfare economics, the
"utility function" could be replaced by a "choice function" that made
no reference to utilities, or by a simple ordinal listing of the options
in the order in which the individual herself would choose them. °
The question of whether a mere ordinal listing could ever suffice to
justify a government decision will be taken up in Part III.
B. Predictive Uses of Economics
First, however, something must be said about the rather different
presuppositions made by economics when it attempts to predict indi-
vidual choices. Obviously, the utility functions just described are use-
less in predicting choices. Since these functions are just a convenient
way of describing or reporting whatever choices the individual would
actually make, any information about the likely content of those
choices must come from some other source. Indeed, this need for in-
formation from some other source may be why some philosophers
have assumed that economics must place more restrictions on the
21
content of utility functions.
Not surprisingly, then, the positive branches of microeconom-
ics-as distinct from the normative branch that is welfare econom-
ics-often do place restrictions on the content of utility functions,
precisely in order to make predictions. Some of these restrictions are
not very controversial-for example, it usually is assumed that indi-
viduals prefer to pay a lower price rather than to pay a higher one
(for the same good), or that they prefer more of a good rather than
less (if it truly is a "good"). But even these restrictions usually require
further information before they can be made operational-for exam-
ple, is elevator music a "good" that people prefer, or is it an unwanted
externality? And when more specific predictions are needed, the
positive branches of economics routinely draw on sources other than
formal utility theory. For example, to predict the equilibrium price of
ice cream an economist must be. able to estimate both the demand
and supply curves, which requires information about consumers'
tastes and spending habits (to estimate the demand curve) and about
20 For this reason, I will use "utility function" and "choice function" (or "choice
ordering") interchangeably throughout the remainder of this Article.
21 See supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
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manufacturers' costs (to estimate the supply). This sort of informa-
tion must come from cost engineers and marketing researchers: it
clearly cannot come from utility theory itself.
Of course, similar predictions are often needed to evaluate gov-
ernment decisions. For example, if the government is deciding
whether to build a new transit system, a number of predictions will be
required (for example, how many people will give up their cars and
use the new system?) simply to identify the likely effects of the deci-
sion. To make these sorts of predictions, analysts must rely on the
best information they have about how individuals choose (making
due allowances, of course, for the cost of gathering better informa-
tion), so they cannot afford to disregard any available information
about the reasons behind individual choices. If any economist is in-
stead making predictions on the basis of an overly thin conception of
what motivates choice, skepticism about the accuracy of those predic-
tions is entirely justified.n
By contrast, though, the task of welfare economics begins only af-
ter these predictions have been made: only after the relevant choices
have all been predicted. After all, even when we have predicted
which citizens will use the transit system, and which citizens will be
able to find better jobs in areas served by the new system, and which
citizens will pay more in taxes-even after we predict all of these ef-
fects, the totality of effects must somehow be evaluated in order to
come to a normative conclusion about the project. Thus, even if the
reasons for individual choices (and not the bare fact of the choices
themselves) must be considered in order to make good predictions,
there is still a separate question about whether the reasons for indi-
vidual choices must be considered in order to reach good normative
conclusions. This is the question I address in Part III.
1. Revealed Preferences
Before reaching that question, however, one other source of con-
fusion must be addressed concerning the use of revealed preferences.
As we have seen, we cannot predict individuals' choices until the con-
tent of their utility rankings has been filled out with information from
This is probably the best reading of many (though not all) of the criticisms in
Nussbaum, supra note 2. See also, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning,
62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943, 1024-25 (1995) (criticizing what he sees as the unduly narrow
basis for predictions in TOMASJ. PHILIPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES
AND PUBLIC HEALTH: THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1993)).
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some other source. But economists have sometimes claimed-or
their critics have sometimes read them as claiming-that in many
cases, the only information that is either useful or required is infor-
mation about the individual's behavior. The claim is that if we observe
that an individual has chosen option x over option y, this tells us that
x must rank higher in that individual's utility function, without the
need for any further information about why she chose x.23
The problem with this approach arises when we try to define the
variables x and y to generate a useful prediction. To illustrate, the
fact that an individual chose to eat ice cream on a hot day in August,
when it had been several hours since she last ate, and when three
friends were eating ice cream with her, cannot in and of itself tell us
anything about what that individual would choose under other cir-
24cumstances. Almost surely, she will be less likely to choose an ice
cream cone if it is a cold day in January, or if she has just finished six
other desserts. She may also be less likely to choose an ice cream
cone if she is by herself, or if her friends are all on diets and have
given up ice cream. Conceivably, she might even be less likely to
choose ice cream if the date is a prime number, or if the Liberal party
is in control of the New Zealand Parliament. Of course, it would be
unusual (to say the least) if these last two factors made any differ-
ence-but they cannot be ruled out. simply by observing what she
chooses on any single, non-prime-numbered date when the Liberal
party is not in power on the other side of the globe. Instead, to the
extent we feel confident in ruling out such bizarre factors (while con-
fidently predicting that local temperature would be relevant), this has
to be because of other sources of knowledge about the kinds of things
23 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 2, at 794 n.48 ("On this view, we do not hypothesize
any supervalue such as utility, but work instead with a rank ordering of individual
preferences, based on actual choices (revealed preferences)." (emphasis added)).
There is some potential for confusion here, since the utility functions used in wel-
fare economics can always be expressed as mere rank orderings, without the need for
any supervalue such as utility. What is distinctive about the "revealed preferences" ap-
proach is that it estimates that ordering by looking only to information about an indi-
vidual's actual behavior. In this otherwise thorough article on incommensurability,
Sunstein did not consider any other method of estimating individuals' rankings. A
better treatment can be found in the more recent article by Richard H. Pildes &
Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 76-83 (1995)
(criticizing the use of revealed preferences, but recognizing that there are other
ways-each with its own potential problems-of trying to estimate the choices that
citizens would make).
2' A useful discussion of this point can be found in Amartya Sen, Internal Consis-
tency of Choice, 61 ECONOMETRIcA 495 (1993).
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that our fellow citizens prefer. Predictions based on this sort of
knowledge may be more or less accurate, but they always will be
merely predictions, so there always will be some risk of error.
For much the same reason, it normally will not be possible to es-
timate an individual's complete utility rankings by asking her about
every choice she could conceivably face. As economists are quick to
point out, an individual's answers to hypothetical questions will not
necessarily be reliable (though this does not prove that they will be
any less reliable than the extrapolations that would have to be made
in their absence). But even if all problems of reliability could be
solved, hypothetical questions still cannot eliminate the need for ex-
trapolations, for every option can vary in an infinite number of ways
(ice cream at 3:56 in the afternoon, ice cream at 3:57, etc.), and there
is no way to ask about every possible variation. There is also no rea-
son to assume that every choice will remain constant over time, so by
the time we got done asking about every possible choice, we would
have to start over in case some of the answers had changed. Thus,
whether we look to actual choices or to answers to hypothetical ques-
tions (or both), any attempt to estimate a utility function will have to
be based on extrapolations from a comparatively small set of data.
We therefore will require some other source of information to figure
out what changes in context are most likely to make a difference.
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Once this is understood, many criticisms of cost-benefit analysis
can also be seen as objections to the accuracy of predictions about in-
dividual choice. For example, Cass Sunstein has criticized cost-
benefit analyses for trying "to measure diverse social goods along the
same metric," citing as examples studies that attempt to measure the
dollar value of each life saved by various safety regulations.2 Phrased
in this way, the criticism seems to derive from a claim about incom-
mensurability, or a claim that lives simply cannot be measured on the
same scale as dollars. However, the core of Sunstein's criticism is ac-
tually rather different.
Like most incommensurabilists, Sunstein does not believe that an
individual would be unable to choose between any particular risk of
death, on the one hand, and any particular quantity of dollars, on the
other.26 That is, even if risks and dollars are incommensurable for
2' Sunstein, supra note 2, at 841-43.
2 See id at 810-12.
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purposes of justifying the individual's choice, the individual should
still be able to choose one or the other in any particular context. And
as long as the individual could make such a choice, we can always
construct a utility function in which that particular risk ranks either
higher or lower than that particular quantity of dollars. Thus, the fact
that risks and dollars are "diverse goods" is not inconsistent with a
single ranking that simply reports or describes whatever choice the
individual would actually make.
Of course, Sunstein could believe that such a ranking would be ir-
relevant for purposes of justifying government decisions: This is the
question to be addressed in the body of this Article. But Sunstein also
makes a different argument that speaks entirely to the accuracy of
predicting the choice an individual might make in one context based
on observations of her actual choices in another. That is,just because
an individual would choose a one-percent risk of death from cancer
over a $300 reduction in wages, it does not follow that she would also
choose a ten-percent risk of being mangled in a car accident over a
$3000 increase in the price of cars (or a $3000 increase in taxes). As
Sunstein says:
When a worker accepts a risky job for cash, it may mischaracterize his
choice to say that he "really" thinks that the risk is equivalent to that
amount of cash-if the word "really" is intended to capture an abstract, acon-
textual judgment. Instead he has simply taken this job in preference to
others among a specific range of opportunities, and this decision, in its• 27
context, means nothing more general.
Notice, though, that the source of inaccuracy or crudeness here
has nothing to do with the philosophical literature on incommensur-
ability, or with the claim that "goods are diverse and valued in differ-
ent ways." 8 After all, the same danger of inaccuracy would be present
even if we were evaluating purely financial risks, where we would still
27 Id at 838 (emphasis added). Many of Elizabeth Anderson's objections to cost-
benefit analysis (though perhaps not all of them) also reduce to this criticism. See, e.g.,
ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 215 (arguing that an individual's rankings are always con-
text dependent); Pildes & Anderson, supra note 2, at 2151-52 (same). The same ap-
pears to be true of one argument made in Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 1202 (arguing
that qualitatively distinct ends make all choices contingent upon context).
28 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 843; see also Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 64
(criticizing traditional cost-benefit analysis for being "obtuse-in the sense of insuffi-
ciently fine grained-insofar as it tries to measure diverse social goods along the same metrid'
(emphasis added)); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 787 ("Because of the existence of diverse kinds
of valuation, we may not be able to generalize acontextual preferences from particular
decisions." (emphasis added)).
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have to be cautious about extrapolating from the choices made by
some individuals in some contexts to the choices made by other indi-
viduals in other contexts.2 In other words, the only sense in which
these goods are "diverse" is that they are being chosen by different
individuals and in different contexts: it is the sense in which ice
cream in August is "diverse" from ice cream in January. While these
diversities of course ought to be taken into account in any cost-benefit
analysis, they have nothing to do with incommensurability in the
sense of the philosophical literature."0
To focus the issue more precisely, suppose that we have predicted
the choice that an individual would make between the actual risks at
issue-and suppose that we are confident in the accuracy of this pre-
diction, perhaps because of our close knowledge of the individual in
question. If we are confident in the accuracy of our prediction, this
means that we have already taken into account all *the relevant differ-
ences between the actual risks at issue and any other choices we may
have observed, at least insofar as those differences are relevant to
predicting what this individual herself would choose. Thus, we will
have already considered whether this individual might feel differently
about death from cancer than she does about death in an auto acci-
dent, or about risks she assumes voluntarily versus risks that are im-
posed on her. As I have stressed all along, in order to make accurate
predictions about individual choices, this sort of additional information
is essential.
Suppose, however, that we now report the choice that we have
predicted in the form of a bare-bones, ordinal ranking (or utility
function) that eliminates all information about the reasons for her
choice. This ranking clearly creates a kind of formal commensurabil-
ity, since it locates the two options along a one-dimensional scale.
However, this ranking achieves formal commensurability only by sup-
2 As finance theorists have recognized, financial investments may themselves vary
across more than one dimension-for example, one may have a higher expected re-
turn while the other has a smaller variance in the range of possible returns. Similarly,
individual investors may differ from one another in their attitude toward risk (and,
hence, in their willingness to trade a higher expected return against a smaller vari-
ance). Nevertheless, these differences should not prevent any given individual from
being able to commensurate any two particular financial investments. For a concise
survey of the technical finance literature on this point, see JONATHAN E. INGERSOLL,
JR., THEORY OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING 95-97, 114-24 (1987).
3' See Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533, 1551 (1996)
(recognizing that to urge the disaggregation of diverse health risks, rather than valu-
ing them all in terms of the same value per unit of risk, "is not to say that there is a
problem of incomparability").
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pressing potentially relevant information about the reasons for the
individual's choice. The key question, then, is whether this ranking
(without the omitted information) can justify a government decision.
If it cannot, then the fact that the options can be ranked in this way
has no more significance than the fact that they can be ranked in al-
phabetical order or by their pleasingness to Ruth Chang's grand-
mother. But if, instead, this ranking can provide a justification for
government decisions, that would make the two options commensu-
rable in the critical sense that I defined in Part I: it would show that
the options can be ranked along a single scale that can justify a gov-
ernment decision. To decide whether these options are commensu-
rable, then, we have to address the question of how government deci-
sions should be justified.
III. DECISIONS AFFECTING A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL
I begin by stacking the deck in favor of the justificatory relevance
of utility functions by assuming that the government must (for some
reason) make a decision that would affect only a single individual.
This is obviously an unrealistic assumption, partly because social in-
terdependencies make such isolated effects unlikely, and partly be-
cause if there ever were such a case, the decision normally would be
left to the individual herself rather than being assigned to the gov-
ernment.3 ' Still, governments sometimes do make decisions that
might be better left to individuals. And welfare economists can still
advise the government in such a case, even if they privately feel that
the government should not be making the decision at all, just as they
could advise government planners in a socialist economy.
I should emphasize that my focus here is on which decision the
government ought to make-for example, should it choose to make
her submit to certain risks or instead give her less money?-and not
on the (arguably prior) question of whether the decision ought to be
made by the government at all. This might appear to be an odd fo-
cus, since much of the prior literature seems driven by the arguably
prior question: by concerns about which decisions should be made
by the government and which should be left to the market. But if
" The more realistic case in which the government's decision would affect differ-
ent individuals differently will be considered in Part IV.
32 This is particularly true of ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 141-89; and of nearly all of
the literature on commodification, such as RADIN, supra note 8. On the other side of
the ideological spectrum, this question is also the principal focus of Richard A.
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two options are truly incommensurable, the impact on the govern-
ment should be greatest when the government itself is the institution
that must, for some reason, make the choice between the incommen-
surable options. Thus, the easiest way to see whether incommensur-
ability undermines economic justifications for government decisions
is to focus on situations where the government itself must choose.
In any event, in this Part, I assume that only a single individual
would be affected by the government's choice. I also assume that the
options from which the government must choose are incommensura-
ble for purposes of the individual's decision, in the sense that there is
no single ranking of those options that would justify the individual's
choice of one rather than the other. However, I also assume that if
the choice had been left to the individual, she would somehow be
able to choose one option over the other: She would not be para-
lyzed with indecision. And I also assume that we can predict the
choice she would make with an acceptable degree of accuracy so that
we can rank the options ordinally to reflect what she herself would
choose. The question, then, is whether this ordinal ranking can jus-
tify the government's choice of whichever option ranks higher.
A. The Relevance of Individual Utility Functions
At this point, there is an obvious argument that the government
would be justified in choosing whichever option ranks higher in the
individual's own choice ordering. After all, if the only affected indi-
vidual would choose some amount of dollars rather than a reduction
in a particular risk-or, of course, if she would instead choose the re-
duction in risk rather than the dollars-why should the government
not give her what she herself would choose? In any liberal society, the
fact that the only affected individual would choose x over ywill usually
have at least some normative relevance in justifying the government's
own choice of x.
Of course, there are many possible objections to this argument,
some of which will be considered below. For now, the important
point is that the ranking used in this argument is one that reports the
bare fact of the individual's choice without conveying any information
about her reasons for the choice. In effect, this argument says that
the government ought to respect the choice that the individual her-
self would make-or, more precisely, our best prediction about the
Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, orls Utility the Ruler of the World, 1995 UTAH L. REV.
683.
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choice she would make-without regard to the soundness of her rea-
sons for making that choice. This argument thus represents a specific
interpretation of the idea that the government ought to be neutral
toward different individuals' conceptions of the good life. As John
Harsanyi has put it, "in deciding what is good and bad for a given in-
dividual, the ultimate criterion can only be his own wants and his own
preferences.""
I mention this because it is sometimes asserted that if utility the-
ory places no restrictions at all on the reasons for an individual's
choice, the result is nothing more than a tautology.34 But this asser-
tion must be handled with care, for the reduction to a tautology (or
not) depends on the purpose for which utility theory is being used. If
it is used in an attempt to predict an individual's choice-that is, to
claim that an individual usually does choose whichever option ranks
highest on her utility function-then we do indeed have a tautology.
As Part II explained, the utility functions used in welfare economics
merely report whatever choice an individual would make, so this sort
of prediction says (tautologously) that "individuals will choose what-
ever they in fact will choose." We also have a tautology-or, at least,
an unhelpful statement-if utility theory is used in an attempt to jus-
t/fy an individual's choices, for it is equally vacuous to say that "an in-
dividual ought to choose whatever she in fact would choose.""
If utility theory is being used to justify government decisions, how-
ever, there is no tautology at all in recommending that "a government
ought to choose whatever the only affected individual would choose."
Thomas Scanlon has correctly characterized this argument as resting
on
the moral claim that when we must decide what is good or bad for oth-
ers, for the purposes, for example, of making decisions about the use of
public resources, we should take those people's wants and preferences
John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in UTILITARIANIsM
AND BEYOND 39, 55 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 40 n.13 (1987) ("[S]ome de-
fenders of utility-based calculation seem to have been tempted to redefine the term
'utility' to cover whatever it is that we wish to value. As a defense of utility-based ethi-
cal calculation this is tautologous and adds little to the discussion.").
35 James Griffin has attempted, by putting more restrictions on the individual's
choice (requiring the choice to be made in a calm frame of mind, etc.) to construct an
argument capable of justifying the result of such a choice. SeeJAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-
BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 21-39, 75-92 (1986). I
take no position on whether his argument is successful, and my argument in this Arti-
cle does not depend on the success of his.
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as our ultimate standard even though these are not what makes things
good .... 36
This moral claim can, of course, be disputed on its merits-but it
cannot be dismissed as a mere tautology.
B. Objections Unrelated to Incommensurability
Now to the merits of the issue. While there are many reasons why
it might not be justified for a government to follow the choice that
the individual herself would make, some of those reasons have noth-
ing to do with incommensurability. Indeed, some of these reasons
have been embraced by economists, and are not even controversial.
For example, if an individual would choose x over y when coerced at
the point of a gun, few would say that the government would there-
fore be justified in choosing x over y. In other words, the normatively
relevant utility function is not one that reports the choices the indi-
vidual would make at gunpoint. But this objection applies to any
choice, and to any x and y, without regard to whether x and y are in-
commensurable.
The same is true of objections based on imperfect information.
Economists sometimes recommend that the government not follow
whatever choice an individual would actually make, but rather the
choice she would have made if she had been perfectly informed.
37
There are, of course, some obvious and not-so-obvious difficulties in
defining what it means to be "perfectly" informed.s But whatever one
thinks of these difficulties (and of their possible resolutions), they
apply with equal force whether or not there is any incommensurabil-
ity involved. For example, the information problem (and its possible
resolutions) would be exactly the same if an individual were misin-
3 Thomas M. Scanlon, The Moral Basis of Interpersonal Comparisons, in INTER-
PERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 17, 26 (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds.,
1991) (emphasis added); see also id. at 24 (referring to this claim as "at base a moral
doctrine," as distinct from an "account of the nature of value").
37 The full economic analysis is actually more complex, for if the government sim-
ply makes a different choice for the individual without correcting her misinformation,
she may go on to make other errors (for example, not using a product in the proper
way, or not buying insurance against risks she is unaware of). For a formal model of
these "second-best" problems, see Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Workmen's Compensation and Oc-
cupationalSafety UnderImperfectInformation, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 80 (1981).
For more detailed discussions of these information problems, see ANDERSON,
supra note 1, at 138-40; GRIFFIN, supra note 35, at 11-14; and Scanlon, supra note 36, at
28-30.
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formed about the merits of two commensurable financial invest-
ments.
Though it may be less obvious, the same is true of objections to
individual choices that are forced by hard circumstances. For exam-
ple, it is sometimes said that there is no reason for the government to
follow someone's decision to accept a dangerous job, or a career as a
prostitute, if that choice was forced on her because her only alterna-
tive was to starve.39 This objection is more dubious on its merits be-
cause, as long as starvation is really the only alternative, it is hard to
see why the government ought to reject the choice the individual her-
self would make and instead require her to accept the only alternative
40of starvation. (If the plan is to introduce some third option, such as
a better welfare program or better employment opportunities,1 the
individual herself presumably would choose that over either of the
first two options, so her own utility function could still be followed.)
Still, even if we ignore this problem and accept the argument for dis-
regarding choices forced by hard circumstances, it remains true that
this argument has nothing to do with incommensurability as such.
That is, if the bleakness of the alternative is what justifies our disre-
garding the individual's own choice, that shouldjustify our disregard
even if the forced choice involved a mere financial investment.
For the remainder of the Article, then, I will set these issues aside
by assuming that we can predict the choice that the individual would
make free from any taint of duress, imperfect information, or other
similar generic problems. The question I address instead is whether
39 Anderson makes this argument (among others) to question the relevance of a
worker's decision to accept some workplace risk (rather than quitting and trying to
find another job) if another job would be very difficult to find. See ANDERSON, supra
note 1, at 197. For a more thorough discussion of hard choices, see generally ALAN
WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987). My own views are set forth in Richard Craswell, Prop-
erty Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1
(1993), and Richard Craswell, Remedies When Contracts Lack Consent: Autonomy and Insti-
tutional Competence 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 209 (1995).
40 This is another version of the second-best problem that arises if the government
tries to alter the individual's choice without correcting the underlying problem. See
supra note 37. Margaret Radin refers to this as the "double bind" problem. Radin, su-
pra note 8, at 1910-11, 1921-25; see also Margaret Jane Radin, Justice and the Market Do-
main, in MARKETS AND JUSTICE 165, 181-82 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock
eds., 1989). Anderson recognizes this problem in some contexts. SeeANDERSON, supra
note 1, at 155-56 (discussing prostitution). However, no such recognition appears
anywhere in her discussion of workplace safety. Seeid. at 197-98.
41 For analyses emphasizing this solution, see Martha C. Nussbaum, "Whether from
Reason or Prejudice": Taking Money for Bodily Services, 27J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming
1998) (manuscript at 37-40, on file with author); and Radin, supra note 40, at 187-88.
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there are any other reasons why the government should not justify its
decision by the bare fact that the only affected individual would her-
self make the same choice. In particular, does the literature on in-
commensurability give us any reason for rejecting this justification for
government decisions?
C. Objections to Subjectivism
As noted earlier, the argument for following whatever choice the
affected individual would make rests on the claim that her choice is
entitled to respect, regardless of the reasons for her choice.
42 This is a
subjectivist argument in the sense that it takes the individual's own
wishes as morally decisive. To be sure, if someone else must try to
predict the individual's choices, then nonsubjective elements will nec-
essarily come into play in making that prediction. But this argument
still aspires to be as subjectivist as possible, both by taking such a pre-
diction as the only justification for a government decision, and by re-
garding the strength of the justification as turning entirely on the ac-
curacy of the prediction. Obviously, then, one way to attack the
justificatory relevance of individual choice functions is to reject the
idea that individuals' subjective wishes should control, and to argue
that the government should instead pursue some 
other goal.4
Of course, this antisubjectivist move requires some justification
(just as the subjectivist position does). One possible argument comes
from Amartya Sen, who has emphasized that there is no necessary or
logical connection between individual choices and objective well-
being. 45 That is, when utility functions are defined so that they merely
report what the individual would choose, there is no logical reason
42 See supra Part III.A.
43 See supra Part II.B.1. A similar point has been made about interpersonal com-
parisons of utility: As such comparisons require one person to judge or estimate the
utility of another, the comparisons cannot be based solely on the second person's sub-
jective utility, because the estimator's own judgments will always exert some influence
over her estimations. See Donald Davidson, Judging Interpersonal Interests, in FOUN-
DATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 195, 196 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds.,
1996).
4 This argument appears to play a major role in Elizabeth Anderson's rejection of
commensurability. See ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 58-59; see also Pildes & Anderson,
supra note 2, at 2193 ("Rational choice should not be understood as a matter of satisfy-
ing undefended preferences, but of articulating good and convincing reasons for
choices.").
See Amartya Sen, Behaviour and the Concept of Preferenc=4 40 ECONOMICA 241, 253-
54 (1973); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Eco-
nomic Theory, 6 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 317, 336 (1977).
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why the resulting ranking would have to coincide with whatever in
fact promotes the individual's well-being (much less why it would co-
incide with what is best according to any other theory of value) .
However, Sen's observation is not itself sufficient to reject the rele-
vance of the individual's own choice unless there is some other basis
for government decisions that, as an empirical matter, will better coin-
cide with the individual's well-being (or with whatever is best accord-
ing to some other theory of value). That is, it is always an empirical
question whether government officials will come closer to whatever is
truly best if they try to make their own assessment of what is best, or if
they instead try to predict what the individual herself would choose.
In any event, even if we accept the argument that the individual's
own choice should not be controlling, we need an additional argu-
ment to get us to the problem of incommensurability. After all, it is
perfectly possible to believe both (1) that government decisions
should rest on some objective theory of the good; and (2) that the
best objective theory permits all options to be ranked along some sin-
gle metric, such as an overall index of well-being.47 In other words, it
is possible to reject subjectivism without also rejecting commensur-
ability.
For purposes of this Article, though, the interesting position is
one that rejects both subjectivism and commensurability. Antisubjec-
tivism implies that the government should not simply look to what-
ever the individual herself would choose; and incommensurability
implies that the government cannot look to any other single metric.
Instead, when the government makes its decision, it will have to face
the same problem the individual herself would have faced: the prob-
lem of reconciling incommensurable options or values. On this view,
then, incommensurability for purposes of the individual's choice will
automatically carry over to produce incommensurability for purposes
of the government's choice. This combination of incommensurability
and antisubjectivism thus offers the most promising avenue of re-
search for future work on incommensurability and the law.
The difficulty this research faces, however, lies in explaining how
the government ought to decide between options that are truly in-
commensurable. As noted earlier, most theories of incommensurabil-
ity do hold that individuals can make rational choices between in-
" This is presumably what Sen meant by the "tautology" statement quoted earlier.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
" For an example of this second position, see Donald H. Regan, Authority and
Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL- L. REV. 995, 1056-61 (1989).
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commensurable options. 8 But if these individual choices are not
themselves entitled to respect (at least not by virtue of the choice it-
self), how then should the government decide? It might seem that
the government should look to the soundness of the reasons that
supported the individual's choice-but what would count as a
"sound" reason if the choice was between options that are incommen-
surable? To answer this question, we need to look more closely at just
how individuals can be said to choose between truly incommensura-
ble options. Unfortunately, this is one of the least-developed aspects
of modem theories of incommensurability; it is also a point on which
different theorists offer different accounts. The following section
considers several possibilities.
D. Alternative Bases forDecisions
1. Existential and Coherence Theories of Choice
Some theorists, in some situations, believe that an individual fac-
ing a choice between incommensurable options must simply choose
one or the other by an irreducible act of will. For example, Joseph
Raz has argued that "reason cannot advise us how to choose between
options which are incommensurate"4 9 -- either for relatively trivial
choices, such as deciding between a walk in the park or staying home
with a book, or for much more significant decisions, such as choosing
between a career in law or philosophy. To be sure, in either of these
cases Raz would not say that the incommensurability of the options
makes the resulting choice irrational. 5 Instead, he believes that ei-
ther choice would be rational, so it is simply up to the individual to
choose.
If we ask what this theory implies for government decisions,
though, it seems to push us back toward the subjectivist position in
which the government might as well try to figure out what choice the
individual herself would have made. That is, if either choice would
be perfectly acceptable and it is simply up to the individual to choose,
on what basis can the government say that the individual should
(objectively) have chosen something else? This theory thus offers no
reason to reject the use of the individual's own choice ordering, and
no reason to reject the utility functions used by welfare economics.
18 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
' RAZ, supra note 1, at 345.
5' See id at 339.
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Less obviously, perhaps, the same may be true of coherence theo-
ries of decisionmaking. Some authors have argued that, while there
may be no way to rank certain options on a single scale (especially
when each of the options would contribute to different values), it is
still possible for an individual to decide which option would make the
best fit with the overall structure she wishes to give to her life."'
Henry Richardson has described this deliberative method as a search
for "narrative unity., 52 While this theory might suggest that the op-
tions were in fact commensurable, since they could then be ranked in
the order of their fit or coherence with the individual's life plan,
Richardson views such a ranking more as a way of reporting the con-
clusion of the individual's deliberations, and not as a ranking with any
independent existence that could justiJf the individual's conclusion.53
When it comes to government decisionmaking, however, these
coherence theories offer no more purchase than did Raz's quasi-
existentialist account. As was just noted, coherence theories do not
provide any prior, objective perspective from which an individual's
choice can be criticized and set aside. Instead, coherence in this
sense reflects the result of a deliberative process: the process by
which an individual decides what shape to give to her life. As
Richardson puts it, "this idea of justification looks to no authority
other than the deliberating agent. 5 4 Thus, on this view too, when the
government makes a decision, it has no reason to look to anything
other than its best prediction about the choice the individual herself
would make.
In short, some theories of incommensurability simply cannot be
combined with the kind of antisubjectivism that would justify the gov-
ernment in overriding an individual's choice. That is, whenever a
theory of incommensurability denies the possibility that the individ-
ual's choice of one incommensurable option over another could be
justified by any objective criteria, or by any criteria external to the in-
dividual herself, that same denial will also make it impossible tojustify
any government decision that would override the individual's choice.
Thus, if incommensurability and antisubjectivism are ever to be com-
bined, that combination will have to draw on a rather different theory
of incommensurability.
" See, e.g., HURLEY, supra note 1, at 203-53; RICHARDSON, supra note 1, at 152-58.
52 RICHARDSON, supra note 1, at 151.
5' See id. at 179-83.
54 Id. at 177; see also HURLEY, supra note 1, at 262 (describing the search for coher-
ence as "a kind of self-interpretation and self-determination").
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2. Constitutive Incommensurability
In contrast to the theories just discussed, some theories of in-
commensurability do yield definite implications about the proper
choice between incommensurable options. One example involves
"constitutive incommensurability," or the claim that certain relation-
ships derive their value (or are "constituted") in part by not being
treated as commensurable with other goods.
For example, Joseph Raz points out that most people would be of-
fended if they were offered money to sell their children, or even to
leave their family for a period of time. On Raz's view, this usually is
not a case of the individual ranking her family on the same scale as
money, but ranking the money lower. Instead, Raz suggests that
many individuals would resist the idea that the two goods (family and
money) were even comparable: They would say that it was simply im-
possible to compare time with their family to any naked cash transfer.
Raz's explanation is that-at least for these people-it would change
the nature of their family relationships if they were to view time with
their family as even potentially exchangeable for cash. And this lets
Raz draw an obvious implication for individual decisions: People who
wish to enjoy such relationships should not choose to trade them for
any amount of money.5
As always, the question of interest here is whether these effects for
the individual of placing family and money on a common scale imply
that there is also no common scale that the government could use. I
think it does not, for two reasons. First, even if the individual in ques-
tion would not regard time with her family as comparable to any pri-
vate offer of money, this does not establish that she would regard a
government offer as similarly incomparable. Perhaps the government
might have a plausible rationale for asking her to leave her family,
thereby making it easier for her to justify her choice. Or perhaps the
plan would not offer her any role in the decision at all (she would be
forcibly relocated with a monetary payment as compensation),
thereby relieving her of any guilt for having chosen the money over
her family.56 Indeed, Raz himself notes that an individual who would
5 See RAZ, supra note 1, at 345-57; see also Warner, supra note 2, at 1705; Richard
Warner, Excluding Reasons: Impossible Comparisons and the Law, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 431, 432 (1995). For somewhat similar views, see ANDERSON, supra note 1;
Radin, supra note 8, at 1908; and infra Part III.D.3.
5 For a discussion of reasons why the individual's involvement in the choice might
make a difference, see Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The "Sophie's Choice" Paradox and the
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not leave her family for money might still do so for a better career
opportunity without necessarily destroying the nature of her relation-
ship. 7 In other words, the source of the money and the other details
of the plan are themselves contextual factors of the sort discussed ear-
lier in this Article.5 8 An individual's response to a private offer of cash
therefore cannot necessarily be extrapolated to predict her response
to a similar government offer.
In any event, even if individuals reject the idea that time with
their family can be valued on the same scale as money from any
source, this still does not establish the irrelevance of the individual's
own choice function for purposes of the government's decision. An
individual who feels this way has an obviously correct choice to make:
She should refuse to give up time with her family for any amount of
money. (For individuals who do not feel this way because they no
longer wish to preserve this kind of relationship, Raz's concern disap-
pears.) And if the individual would choose to stay with her family,
there is surely nothing that prevents the government from taking this
into account and choosing the option the individual herself would
choose. In other words, there is still nothing wrong with the govern-
ment commensurating the two options according to the individual's
own choice ordering and choosing the option that ranks higher.5 9
The key here is that Raz's concern operates only on the individual
level, or only on the actual parties to the relationship. That is, even if
it is true that the relationship itself would change if one of the parties to
that relationship began ranking the relationship on the same scale as
money, it does not follow that the relationship would change if an
outside observer (such as the government) began ranking the two goods
on the same scale." Instead, the only way the relationship could
Discontinuous Self. Two Comments on Wertheimer, 74 DENv. U. L. REv. 1255, 1267-68
(1997).
17 See RAZ, supra note 1, at 348-49.
See supra Part II.B.1.
'9 See also Warner, supra note 2, at 1733 (arguing that the government must "give
due weight to the fact that" the individual would not trade the relationship in question
for any amount of money, and that it must "take[] such commitments appropriately
into account"). Warner does not explicitly say that "due" weight and "appropriate"
accounting are satisfied whenever the government makes the same choice that the
individual herself would make. However, nothing in his argument is inconsistent with
this conclusion.
6o For somewhat similar responses to Raz's argument, see Chang, supra note 1, at
23-25, and Regan, supra note 47, at 1067-71. A rather different critique, which focuses
on the interdependency (in a well-functioning family) between the decisionmaker and
the other family members, is raised in Epstein, supra note 32, at 696-97.
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change as a result of outsiders comparing it with money is if there
were some further force at work: some psychological spillover, for
example, in which the outsiders' ranking somehow affected the par-
ties' own view of their relationship. As noted earlier, these psycho-
logical effects would take us beyond the scope of this Article.6 My
only claim here is that Raz's theory about the constitution of individ-
ual relationships does not, by itself, imply that there would be any-
thing wrong with the government's ranking of the options according
to an individual's utility function.
3. Expressive Theories of Choice
A somewhat similar view has been advanced by Elizabeth
Anderson. On Anderson's account, rational action requires that an
individual express certain attitudes toward the things that individual
values.62 Anderson also believes that an individual who regards cer-
tain values as commensurable with money would not be expressing
the proper attitude toward those values. For example, if parents were
allowed to sell their children, Anderson believes that such a sale
"would express attitudes toward children that contradict the norms of
parental love."6 '
It would be possible to read Anderson's theory as addressing the
choices that individuals ought to make, without any implications for
the government. That is, one could believe that parents should not
sell their children, for the reasons Anderson gives, while also believ-
ing that the state should not override the (misguided) 'choice of those
parents who disagree. This seems to be Raz's position, for Raz does
not suggest that the government should prohibit anyone from alter-
ing constitutively incommensurable relationships by treating those re-
lationships as commensurable with money.6 However, Anderson
wants to make the stronger argument: She wants to prohibit individu-
als from selling their children (and also to prohibit the "advance sale"
of a child through contracts by a surrogate mother). 65 In effect,
Anderson argues that individuals should not be allowed to express cer-
61 1 do, however, consider some of these effects briefly in connection with "corn-
modification." See infra Part III.E.
612 SeeANDERSON, .supra note 1, at 17.
6 Id. at 172.
' See RAZ, supra note 1, at 352-53.
SeeANDERSON, supra note 1, at 185-86.
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tain kinds of improper attitudes, even if the individuals would for
some reason choose to do so.
Of course, this argument is hard to defend in the artificial case
that I have assumed here, where the choosing individual is the only
one who would be affected by that choice. In such a case (admittedly
an unrealistic one), it is not even clear that Anderson herself would
wish to make the argument I have just attributed to her. For exam-
ple, many of Anderson's objections to commercial surrogacy rest on
what I have called commodification-on concerns about the effect on
widely held stereotypes of women.6 Anderson also points out that a
woman's decision to enter a surrogacy contract can affect more than
67
her own welfare; it could also affect the welfare of the child. She
also believes that some surrogates (many? all?) are induced into their
contracts by a form of fraud, or that they are "psychologically co-
erce[d]."68 These concerns with fraud, coercion, or the effects on
third parties clearly do not rest on the claim that surrogacy contracts
necessarily express an improper moral attitude.Y
Still, since expressions of an improper attitude are most problem-
atic when others besides the choosing individual would be affected, it
will be easier to defer further discussion of this issue to Part IV. Be-
fore leaving the topic of surrogacy, however, a brief word about the
problem of commodification may be helpful.
E. Objections to Commodification
Part of Anderson's objection to commercial surrogacy contracts
rests on concerns about commodification. For example, she argues
that permitting surrogacy may reinforce negative stereotypes of
See iL at 182-83.
67 See id. at 172. Anderson does not rest her opposition to surrogacy primarily on
its effects on children, though, for she emphasizes that "the focus on narrow welfare
consequences to children of contract pregnancy obscures the larger expressive signifi-
cance of selling infants." Id.
Id. at 180-81, 187. On the use of "psychological coercion" in commercial trans-
actions generally, and the difficult normative issues raised by this concept, see Richard
Craswell, The Identification of UnfairPractices by the Federal Trade Commission, 1981 Wis. L.
REV. 107, 139-51.
6' Anderson also argues that surrogacy contracts impermissibly restrict the surro-
gate's physical and emotional autonomy by requiring her to submit to various medical
controls over her health, and by discouraging her from forming an emotional attach-
ment to the child. See ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 175-79. Space limitations prevent
me from discussing these arguments further, but these, too, seem to have little to do
with incommensurability as such.
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women and promote a destructive patriarchal model of altruism.
7 I
take these to be contingent empirical claims about the actual conse-
quences of commercial surrogacy.7' As noted earlier, their soundness
depends on complicated questions of social psychology that are be-
yond my competence to evaluate, and hence are beyond the scope of
this Article.
It is worth noting, however, that most critics of commodification
have been very cautious about predicting when and how commodifi-
cation is likely to occur. For example, MargaretJane Radin cautions:
Rather than merely assuming that money is at the core of every transac-
tion in "goods," thereby making commodification inevitable and phas-
ing out the non-commodified version of the "same" thing (or the non-
market aspects of sale transactions), we should evaluate the domino
theory [i.e., the likely spillover effects on other parties and other trans-
actions] on a case-by-case basis. We should assess how important it is to
us that any particular contested thing remain available in a noncom-
modified form and try to estimate how likely it is that allowing market
transactions for those things would engender a domino effect and make
the nonmarket version impossible.72
Other authors have been even more cautious, and many are generally
skeptical.7
While I cannot directly assess these psychological effects, it is
worth considering the connection (if any) between the psychological
effects and the normative arguments discussed in this Article. In par-
ticular, suppose I am correct as a normative matter: Suppose that an
option's ranking on an individual's utility function does provide an
acceptable justification for a government decision (at least where only
a single individual is affected). Can it still be argued that the gov-
ernment's decision, or its use of a ranking based on the individual's
own utility function, is likely to produce undesirable psychological
spillovers? That is, if the government announces that "we have cho-
70 See i at 182-85.
71 See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 69 ("This [commodification] objection is
based on an empirical claim that the kinds of valuation reflected in law will affect so-
cial valuations in general. Sometimes this is right, but sometimes it is not.").
7 Radin, supra note 8, at 1914.
73 On the skeptical side, see Scott Altman, (Com)rodifyingExperienc; 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 293 (1991), and Eric Mack, Dominos and the Fear of Commodification, in MARKETS
AND JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 198. See also MICHAELJ. TREBILCOciC, THE LIMrrs OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 23-29, 56-57 (1993); Nussbaum, supra note 41 (manuscript at
29-33). The Altman article provides a particularly useful survey of the psychological
mechanisms that might either contribute to or help prevent commodification. See
Altman, supra, at 326-28.
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sen option x over all other options, and we have done so for the sole
reason that we think the affected individual would herself choose op-
tion x," could such an announcement lead citizens to think that chil-
dren have no value except as a financial asset, or that women are
nothing but reproductive factories, or that a beautiful gorge is no
longer something to be viewed with awe?74
I will concede that the answer to these questions is "yes," and that
the government's use of individuals' utility functions could trigger any
of these consequences. Human psychology is, after all, a funny busi-
ness. The undesirable consequences might be especially likely
(though still far from certain) if the government bases its predictions
on unsound assumptions about the individual's utility functions-for
example, if it says that "we think this woman would choose surrogacy
because we think she views herself as nothing more than a reproduc-
tive factory," or "we think the affected individual would choose
cheaper electricity because we think she is unlikely to care about natu-
ral beauty." As noted earlier, welfare economics requires someone to
make predictions in order to estimate the content of individuals'
choice functions,75 and it is easy to imagine those predictions being
based on grounds that (if known) could reinforce undesirable stereo-
types.
As these examples suggest, however, the undesirable psychologi-
cal consequences often seem most plausible when the government's
metric is normatively unjustified. To take another example, consider
that librarians regularly rank works of literature along a single metric
(alphabetical order). Booksellers may even keep their accounts in a
way that ranks the same works of literature according to a financial
metric, such as wholesale cost. But nobody argues that these practices
are likely to produce undesirable psychological spillovers, such as
causing citizens to believe that literary merit depends solely on the
author's rank in the alphabet. Instead, since we can all see the le-
gitimate reasons that librarians might have for choosing an alphabetic
ordering (or the reasons that booksellers might have for keeping use-
ful financial records), we resist the conclusion that peoples' attitudes
will be undesirably altered by these practices.
74 Pildes and Anderson suggest that the government, at least in certain cases, could
remain "neutral" and avoid psychological spillovers by announcing an outcome and
giving a reason that is independent of the substantive merits of the issue. See Pildes &
Anderson, supra note 2, at 2167-69. However, they do not consider whether reasons
based on an individual's utility function could or should be interpreted in this way.
75 See supra Part II.B.
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I suggest that a similar phenomenon may explain the attribution
of undesirable psychological effects to the government's use of wel-
fare economics. If one already believes that welfare economics is
normatively wrong-that is, normatively wrong for reasons that would
hold even in the absence of psychological spillovers-it may then
seem quite natural to assume that the widespread use of welfare eco-
nomics will produce undesirable psychological spillovers, thus supply-
ing a further reason for objecting to its use. This may be why many
critics of welfare economics are quick to assume that it will produce
undesirable spillovers, even without conclusive psychological evi-
dence.76 But if one instead believes that welfare economics is norma-
tively appropriate-appropriate, that is, as long as there are no unde-
sirable psychological spillovers-its use by the government will then
seem perfectly defensible, like the librarian's use of the alphabet or
the bookseller's use of financial accounts. And while even a defensi-
ble practice could give rise to undesirable psychological spillovers,
such spillovers should not simply be presumed in the absence of psy-
chological evidence.
In any event, my argument in this Article is that the criteria of
welfare economics are normatively justifiable, at least in the absence
of any undesirable psychological spillovers. More precisely, I admit to
several possible problems with commensurating options using an in-
dividual's own utility functions, but I claim that these are either prac-
tical problems of implementation (how can individual choices best be
predicted?); problems that have nothing to do with incommensur-
ability (for example, problems involving coercion or imperfect in-
formation); or problems that primarily have to do with effects on
third parties. Accordingly, it is now time to drop the assumption that
only a single individual would be affected, and turn explicitly to third-
party effects.
IV. DECISIONS AFFECTING MORE THAN ONE INDIVIDUAL
My analysis so far has been limited to cases where only a single
individual would be affected by a government decision. In this Part, I
assume instead that the decision affects at least two individuals, and
that (whichever option the government chooses) at least one person
76 Compare Elizabeth Anderson's criticism (a correct one, in my view) of the con-
sequentialists who are quick to assume, without empirical evidence, that the long-run
balance of costs and benefits will justify their condemnation of various unpalatable
practices. SeeANDERSON, supra note 1, at 69.
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will gain and one person will lose. In such a case, the government
cannot justify its decision by pointing to any individual utility func-
tion, because each option will rank higher on one individual's func-
tion and lower on the other's. Moreover, if the individual utility func-
tions merely report an ordinal ranking of each individual's choices
(as I have assumed throughout), the government will also be unable
to justify its decision by comparing the gain to one individual against
the loss to the other, because a purely ordinal ranking provides no
quantitative information about how much each individual would gain
or lose. In order for the two choices to be commensurable, there-
fore-commensurable, that is, for purposes of the government's deci-
sion-their commensurability will have to be based on something
other than ordinal individual utility functions.
A. Formal Welfare Economics
Interestingly, at this point many economists embrace the concept
of incommensurability and agree that economics can supply no single
metric by which gains and losses to different individuals can be
ranked. Indeed, it is probably fair to say that the mainstream of wel-
fare economics (at least since the 1930s) has accepted the proposition
that there is no meaningful way to make interpersonal comparisons
of utility.77 On this view, a choice between two options requires a
"social welfare function" which states how "society" would rank the
various options. Moreover, the mainstream view also holds that this
social welfare function must be supplied by some discipline other
than economics.7 8
Interestingly, for economists who hold this view, the scope of in-
commensurability is actually broader than that claimed by many phi-
losophers. If interpersonal comparisons are impossible, then in-
7 For an early (and influential) statement of this position, see LIONEL ROBBINS,
AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 138-41 (2d ed.
1935). For a useful discussion of the history of economic thought on this point, see
generally Robert Cooter & Peter Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists Wrong About Welfare
Economics?, 22J. ECON. LITERATURE 507 (1984).
78 See Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons
of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 550 (1939) (describing the choice between Pareto-optimal
equilibria as one involving "a political question on which the economist, qua econo-
mist, could hardly pronounce an opinion"). This is also how the social welfare func-
tion is described in microeconomics textbooks. See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, MICRO-
ECONOMICANALYSIS 153 (1978) ("One way to resolve these problems is to hypothesize
the existence of some social welfare function .... We will refrain from making philo-
sophical comments here andjust postulate that some such function exists. .. ").
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commensurability is not limited to choices between fundamentally
different options, such as a hydroelectric dam and a beautiful moun-
tain gorge. Instead, mainstream welfare economics treats even finan-
cial options (including cash!) as incommensurable, as long as they af-
fect different people. Thus, while welfare economics may deny the
incommensurability of goods or of values, it has long recognized the
incommensurability of people. 9
To be sure, welfare economics does employ a social welfare func-
tion ("SWF") to describe how various options might be ranked."' In
formal mathematical analyses, this function assigns a numerical value
to each of the possible options. Sometimes this numerical value is
even referred to as a measure of "social welfare" or "social utility,"8'
thus implying that every option can still be ranked according to a sin-
gle metric.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the SWF implies
that every option is commensurable for purposes of the government's
decision. Commensurability, as I have defined it, exists only if there
is a single metric that justifles the choice of one option over another.
But the SWF used in welfare economics is not whatjustifies the choice
of one option, for the SWF simply describes a choice that must be justi-
fied on some independent ground. That is, while a SWF does pre-
suppose that "society" is somehow able to choose between any two op-
tions, thereby making it possible to rank the options in the order in
which they would be chosen, the SWF does not presuppose anything
at all about what might justify society's choice. In this respect, the
SWF is exactly analogous to an individual's utility or choice function,
which reports an individual's choice but is not itself whatjustifies that
choice.
79 A similar point is made by Epstein, supra note 32, at 688. Note that this recogni-
tion of the difficulty of interpersonal tradeoffs should itself be enough to refute any
charge that economics neglects "the separateness of persons as an important issue in
personal and social choice." Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 1205. In fairness, Nussbaum
may intend this criticism to apply only to Henry Sidgwick and to some of the classical
utilitarians (and perhaps also to macroeconomics and developmental economics). In
this portion of her article, Nussbaum does not refer to any modern work of welfare
economics.
go The social welfare function originated in the work of PAUL A. SAMUELSON,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 219-30 (enlarged ed. 1983) (originally pub-
lished in 1947), and Abram Burk (now Bergson), A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of
Welfare Economics, 52 Q.J. ECON. 310 (1938).
" See VARIAN, supra note 78, at 153 (describing the SWF as one that "gives us the
'social utility' resulting from any distribution of private utilities").
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This point is related to John Harsanyi's demonstration that if the
SWF meets certain minimal conditions, it can always be represented
as some function of the utility of each affected individual, with differ-
ent individuals' utilities given different weights.
82 It might therefore
appear that to accept a SWF is to accept the idea that individual utili-
ties can meaningfully be summed, and that government choices can
be justified on the basis of the resulting total. As a number of authors
have pointed out, however, all that Harsanyi's proof establishes is that
any given SWF (or any given ranking of society's choices) can always
be described or represented as a sum of weighted utilities, in the sense
that there will always be some sum of weighted utilities that would
rank each of the options in the same order as "society" would.8 But
Harsanyi's proof does not establish that this ranking is what justifies
the government's decision. Instead, even on Harsanyi's account, the
justification for the decision is supplied by whatever produced the
SWF ranking in the first place, for that is the ranking that the sum-of-
weighted-utilities function has been 
chosen to reflect.
84
In short, mainstream welfare economics does not pretend to offer
any theory of how to justify decisions that affect more than one indi-
vidual, if some individuals would gain while others would lose. Un-
fortunately, most government decisions do affect more than one per-
son (and there almost always is both a winner and a loser). By
necessity, then, economists who wish to evaluate most real govern-
ment decisions have had to go beyond what I am calling mainstream
welfare economics by finding some way to compare gains and losses
that are felt by different persons. The following section discusses sev-
eral methods that have enjoyed some use among economists.
B. The Kaldor-Hicks Criterion (and Its Variants)
One way to evaluate programs that produce both winners and
losers is known as the Kaldor-Hicks (or "potential compensation") cri-
82 SeeJohn C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Com-
parisons of Utility, 63J. POL. ECON. 309 (1955). The "minimal conditions" involve such
requirements as: If everybody in society ranks two options equally, then the SWF
should also rank them equally; or if everybody ranks one option higher than another,
then the SWF should also rank that option higher.
as A useful survey of the literature on this point can be found in John A. Weymark,
A Reconsideration of the Harsanyi-Sen Debate on Utilitarianism, in INTERPERSONAL
COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note 36, at 255.
84 The analogous point about individual utility functions was previously discussed
in this Article. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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terion.85 This method involves two steps: (1) Each individual's gain
or loss is measured by the maximum amount that individual would
choose to pay in order to receive the gain or to avoid the loss; then
(2) one option is ranked higher than another if the total amount that
the winners would be willing to pay exceeds the total amount that the
losers would demand to be paid.86 While this method may not yield
consistent rankings between every pair of options, since some of the
rankings it generates could be intransitive, it will permit many of the
options to be ranked in many real-world situations.
There are also many possible variations on the Kaldor-Hicks ap-
proach. For example, the maximum that each individual would
choose to pay for any option will often depend on that individual's
wealth, so the original Kaldor-Hicks criterion could favor options
whose benefits are received by the wealthy and whose costs are borne
by the poor. To deal with this problem, some economists recom-
mend a weighted version of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion in which the
maximum that each individual would choose to pay is multiplied by a
factor greater or less than one, with the least wealthy individuals get-
ting the largest multipliers. The most extreme form of such a
weighted system is the maximin principle, in which any reduction in
the welfare of the worst-off citizens would always outweigh any in-
crease in the welfare of the better-off.8s Of course, multipliers could
SeeJohn R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939);
Kaldor, supra note 78, at 549-50.
I abstract here from the question of whether one should compare the amount
the losers or winners would have to be paid or the amount they would be willing topay.
While this distinction can be important for many practical purposes, it is not crucial to
any of the issues I discuss here. For a useful discussion of the distinction itself, see
Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Le-
gal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1993). Some possible implications
for cost-benefit analysis are discussed in Richard Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-
Benefit Analysis and the Determination of Legal Entitlements, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1169, 1178-84
(1984).
87 See T. de Scitovzky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REv. ECON. STUD.
77, 83-87 (1941). For the remainder of this Article, I will set aside those cases in which
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion will not yield complete and transitive rankings so that I may
focus on the question of whether (or when) the rankings provided by the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion can justify government decisions. The problems that arise when the
Kaldor-Hicks criterion cannot even provide complete or transitive rankings are dis-
cussed in Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
1371 (1998).
This use of the maximin principle usually is attributed to JOHN RAwLs, A
THEORY OFJUSTICE 152-57 (1971). Rawls, however, did not recommend that this prin-
ciple be used to evaluate any change in the welfare of the citizens, but only to evaluate
a society's basic institutions. See id. at 7, 157-58.
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also be based on other factors such as intelligence, public service, or
even degrees of consanguinity with the royal family. Compared to
these variations, the original Kaldor-Hicks criterion represents the
special case in which every citizen's willingness to pay is given exactly
the same weight.
Other variations simply exclude the amount that individuals
would be willing to pay under certain problematic circumstances. For
example, one recurring issue concerns the extent to which an indi-
vidual's willingness to pay for an option should be disregarded if it is
based on certain other-regarding preferences (malice, envy, altruism,
etc.)." And Richard Posner once endorsed a somewhat idiosyncratic
criterion ("wealth maximization") which refused to count the gains
received by any party who forced an option on another without the
other party's consent, if the circumstances were such that the other
party's consent should have been obtained.
90 For example, in evaluat-
ing the simple theft of A's goods by B, Posner refused to count the
amount that B would have been willing to pay for those goods, be-
cause B chose not to pay that amount and instead took them without
A's consent. But if B had been a starving hiker who broke into a re-
mote cabin without A's consent, Posner was willing to count the value
of the goods to B, because the difficulty of obtaining A's consent was
so high that it excused B's behavior. 9'
There is, of course, much that could be said for and against each
of these variations. For purposes of this Article, however, the impor-
tant fact is that every one of these variations permits policy options to
be ranked according to a single scale. That is, since every one of
these variations measures individual gains and losses by how much
each individual would be willing to pay, every variation also permits a
summing of the various gains and losses to arrive at an overall ranking
of the options. Thus, if any one of these variations is accepted as a
proper justification for government decisions, that would make the
options commensurable as far as the government's decision was con-
cerned.
89 See, e.g., Harsanyi, supra note 33, at 47; Scanlon, supra note 36, at 27-28; Amartya
Sen, The Impossibility ofa Paretian Liberal 78J. POL. ECON. 152 (1970).
See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OFJUsTICE 63 (2d ed. 1983).
9' See id. at 65-75. Posnerjustified his conclusions about when the other party's
consent should have been obtained on a variety of pragmatic or libertarian or Kantian
principles. He could notjustify these conclusions on grounds of wealth-maximization,
because the conditions under which the other party's consent should have been ob-
tained were part of his definition of the end to be maximized ("wealth").
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A theorist who wishes to argue against commensurability, then,
must argue that there are at least some government decisions that
cannot be justified either by the Kaldor-Hicks criterion or by any of its
variations.92 While there are many objections that might be raised
against the Kaldor-Hicks criteria, the remaining parts of this Article
consider those objections that are most relevant to theories of in-
commensurability.
C. Objections to the Kaldor-Hicks Criteria
1. Objections to Comparisons Across Individuals
One line of attack challenges the way that the Kaldor-Hicks crite-
ria balance gains and losses to different individuals. For example, it
might be argued that the Kaldor-Hicks criteria would permit the in-
terests of the poorest members of society to be sacrificed for those of
the wealthiest, if the gains to the latter (as measured by the Kaldor-
Hicks criteria) exceed the losses to the former.
This particular criticism, however, can easily be accommodated
without abandoning commensurability. As noted earlier, the original
Kaldor-Hicks criterion can be modified by assigning different weights
to the amounts that different individuals would be willing to pay for
some policy.93 By choosing appropriate weights, we can give the
choices of the poor as much or as little priority as we like, up to and
including a metric in which only the choices of poor people are con-
sidered (by assigning a zero weight to the choices of everyone else).9'
And whatever weights are chosen, it will still be possible to sum the
amount that every individual is willing to pay (after that amount has
been multiplied by the appropriate weight) to construct a metric that
ranks each of the possible options along a single dimension.
For simplicity, I will not keep adding the phrase "and its variants" every time I
refer to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. Except where otherwise specified, when I speak of
the "Kaldor-Hicks criteria," I am referring to both the original Kaldor-Hicks criterion
and each of the variations discussed above.
93 See supra text accompanying note 88. Note that, in this respect, even the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion-or, at least, its variations that employ differential weights-cannot be
said to neglect the differences between individuals. Cf supra note 79 and accompany-
ing text. It may or may not adopt the best method of accounting for interpersonal dif-
ferences, but it cannot be said to neglect those differences entirely.
'4 This is referred to as the maximin principle. See supra note 88 and accompany-
ing text.
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2. Objections to Subjectivism in Assessing Individual Welfare
Instead, a more interesting line of attack challenges the way that
the Kaldor-Hicks criteria adopt each individual's own choices as a
measure of that individual's interests. After all, even in the weighted
variation described above, the weighting factor is used to multiply the
amount that each individual would be willing to pay for each of the possi-
ble options. But this means that each individual's subjective choices,
concerning how much she willingly would pay for each option, will
determine how her weight will be "voted" when all the individual in-
terests are summed. For example, if a particular poor person cares
nothing about the environment, and would sacrifice a beautiful gorge
for even a small amount of money, that person will be treated as as-
signing a very small value to preserving the gorge. The same is true
of individuals who happily would sell their right to vote, or who prefer
pushpin to poetry, or who make any other choice that might be un-
justifiable from the standpoint of objective theories of value. In short,
while the Kaldor-Hicks criteria necessarily take an objective stance in
deciding how much weight each individual's interests ought to re-
ceive, they are entirely subjectivist in deciding what ought to count as
each individual's interest.
As a consequence, the Kaldor-Hicks criteria can be attacked by
arguing that government decisions ought to be based on some more
objective theory of value: a theory that is not (necessarily) tied to
what individuals themselves would choose.
95 Of course, this rejection
of subjective theories of value requires some justification, as discussed
earlier in Part III.C (in connection with government actions that af-
fect only a single individual). In cases where more than one individ-
ual would be affected, however, the case for respecting the bare fact
of an individual's choice arguably is weaker, for this could require
some people to give up essential interests to satisfy others' strongly
felt but (in some sense) unjustifiable whims. For example, in criticiz-
ing choice-based interpretations of the negligence standard in tort
law, Gregory Keating has questioned whether average individuals
should be required to put their safety at risk just because some drivers
have an intense desire to speed on their way to the beach, or because
some teenagers get an intense thrill from playing chicken with a rail-
" In welfare economics, this nonsubjectivist approach is often discussed in con-
nection with "merit goods." See Richard Musgrave, Merit Goods, in 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE: A DIcTIONARY OF ECONoMics 452-53 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
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road train.9 When interpersonal tradeoffs are required, it might be
argued that the government should make both (1) an objective
judgment of the weight to be accorded to different individuals' inter-
ests, as is required under all versions of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion,
and (2) an objective judgment about the permissible content of each
individual's interests.
Indeed, Richard Posner suggested a similar argument when he
later expressed reservations about some aspects of his "wealth maxi-
mization" criterion. Posner wondered whether a scarce supply of
growth hormone should necessarily be allocated to "a wealthy man
who wants to put a couple of inches on his normal height and can
outbid a poor dwarf who could use the hormone to attain a normal
height."9 7 To be sure, this example turns partly on a difference in
wealth between the dwarf and the rich man, and this difference could
be negated by the use of wealth-related weights. However, a similar
problem could arise if the person of normal height was no more
wealthy, but simply had an extremely intense desire (even more in-
tense than the dwarf's desire to reach normal height) to be a few
inches taller. In essence, problems like these represent different ver-
sions of Nozick's "utility monster"98-and utility monsters have always
posed difficulties for subjectivist theories of interpersonal decision-
making.
To be sure, the claim that the government should disregard the
individual's own choice is not free from difficulties of its own, even in
cases where other individuals would be affected. For example, if it
would be justifiable for a swimming enthusiast to drive at forty-five
miles per hour to get to the beach to pursue a reasonable desire to
swim, would driving at that speed become unjustifiable if she decided
she no longer liked swimming, and wanted instead to drive to a field
to count blades of grass (which, let us stipulate, is a goal of no objec-
See Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48
STAN. L. REV. 311, 367-70 (1996). As Keating puts it, "[p]rinciples of mutual freedom
differ markedly from those of individual freedom. Individually, we are free to expose
ourselves to risks that would be unreasonable to impose on others." ML at 323.
97 POSNER, supra note 90, at v.
See ROBERT NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 41 (1974). Nozick's utility
monster was objectionable because his utility was much greater than everyone else's,
so his preferences (in effect) received too much weight when all the utilities were
summed. But even if everyone's preferences receive the same weight, a similar prob-
lem arises if the content of an individual's preferences is "monstrous," and if these
monstrous preferences are treated on the same footing as everyone else's more legiti-
mate concerns. I am grateful to Gregory Keating for helping me understand this dis-
tinction.
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tive value)? Similarly, if we decide that it would be justifiable for the
government to give everyone in society $500 for preventive health
care, must we overrule any individual who would rather live a slightly
less healthy life in order to spend the money on books about art?"
What if she instead wants to spend it on mystery novels, or on porno-
graphic videos? Obviously there are serious difficulties (both concep-
tual and practical) in asking the government to make objective judg-
ments about tradeoffs such as these, while still giving adequate scope
to different individuals' conceptions of the good.
In any event, if the government is to base its choices on some
nonsubjectivist theory of value, this raises the question of what theory
of value it ought to use. The following section considers several pos-
sibilities, concentrating on those that might fit with theories of in-
commensurability.
D. Alternative Bases for Decisions
1. Lexical Orderings
One alternative to the Kaldor-Hicks criteria would assign a lexical
priority to certain goods. That is, it might be possible to identify a set
of essential goods, perhaps along the lines of Rawls's basic liberties, 0
that could never justifiably be sacrificed to achieve more of some
other kind of good. For example, it might be thought that it is never
legitimate to sacrifice environmental values (or political freedoms) to
obtain more economic growth. Indeed, this sort of claim is popularly
associated with the idea of incommensurability, though-for the rea-
sons discussed below-this is not what most incommensurabilists ac-
tually believe.
The principal problem with a lexical ranking of goods is that it is
usually implausible on its merits. That is, there are few if any goods
whose priority is truly lexical on the social level, in the sense that they
could never be sacrificed for any amount of savings in any other
good. 01 Perhaps life itself might be such a good, in the sense that it
9This example is suggested by GRIFFIN, supra note 35, at 45.
'® See RAWLS, supra note 88, at 60-61;JOHN RAWLS, The Basic Liberties and Their Pior-
ity, in POITICAL LIBERALISM 289 (1993).
"' The most plausible exceptions involve political theories that treat individual
rights as absolute trumps, which cannot be set aside for any instrumental values.
These theories can be read as asserting a lexical ordering between rights and certain
instrumental values, or even as asserting a kind of incommensurability (between rights
and whatever instrumental values are excluded). See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
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might never be legitimate to take someone's life with absolute cer-
tainty in order to achieve purely financial savings (though even this
would be debatable if the financial gains were large enough, and if
the uses to which those gains might be put were sufficiently noble).
In any event, no such lexical ban can be placed on conduct that
merely risks the loss of life, for we regularly accept greater or lesser
risks of death. And since very few policy options require anyone to
lose her life with absolute certainty, a principle that includes (at
most) cases of certain death is not very useful.
Indeed, few if any theorists endorse a truly lexical. ordering, in the
sense that they would never accept any reduction in the favored goods
in order to get more of some other good. For example, while John
Rawls assigns some priority to basic liberties by ranking them ahead of
economic goods in most situations, he allows them to be reduced if
doing so would be necessary to raise a society out of extreme eco-
nomic hardship.1 12 Elizabeth Anderson, too, is quite explicit that her
views about incommensurability do not preclude her from sacrificing
certain goods (for example, environmental values) in order to obtain
other economic benefits.'03 The same is true of the constitutive in-
commensurabilities discussed earlier in Part III.D.2, where it was
claimed that it would be inconsistent with a certain kind of relation-
ship even to consider exchanging that relationship for money. Since
most who hold this view do not believe that it is mandatory for an in-
dividual to enter (or maintain) any particular kind of relationship,
they can freely concede that the individual would be justified in
abandoning the relationship if the cost of maintaining it became too
high (thus sacrificing the quality of the relationship in order to ob-
tain other, nonrelationship benefits) .'4
2. Other Objective Orderings
Instead, most incommensurabilists argue that while certain trade-
offs or sacrifices are indeed justifiable, the justifications for those
tradeoffs cannot be captured by the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, or by any
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY at xi (1977); NOZICK, supra note 98, at 29-33. But this question is
already the subject of a vast literature, and I see nothing to be gained by viewing it
through the lens of incommensurability.
"" See RAwLs, supra note 88, at 541-43. (To a similar effect, see NozIcK, supra note
98, at 30.) The priority of basic liberties is qualified in additional ways in RAwLS, supra
note 100.
'0 See ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 59-64, 66-67, 230 n.6.
, For an explicit discussion of this point, see Warner, supra note 2, at 1728-29.
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other criterion that tries to reduce all of the relevant considerations
to a single metric. This, of course, is the incommensurability argu-
ment defined in Part I: No reduction to a single metric can yield a
ranking that is capable of just~fying the government's decision.
To be sure, even if one rejects the Kaldor-Hicks criterion as an ac-
ceptable justification, there might be other single metrics that could
take its place. For example, it might be possible to define well-being
in terms of some objective list of the actual goods and services avail-
able to each individual-though this would require someone to de-
cide which goods and services are objectively most important."" Ob-
jective well-being might also be defined in terms of the development
of personal capabilities, as suggested by Amartya Sen -though this
requires a similar sort ofjudgment about which capabilities are most
important. In either case, it might also be possible to construct an
overall index of objective well-being, allowing the government to rank
options according to this single metric. To the extent that critics of
the Kaldor-Hicks criteria prefer such an index, they are not really de-
nying commensurability itself, but are merely objecting to one par-
ticular class of metrics (metrics based on subjective intensities of
preference). As noted earlier, it is possible to reject subjectivism
without also rejecting commensurability107
As before, though, the issues of interest here are the ones that
arise if commensurability, too, is rejected, so that it is impossible to
construct a single index of objective well-being (or of any other rele-
vant moral goal). However, this combination still leaves us with the
problem of deciding how government decisions ought to be justified
in cases where objective commensurability is lacking (and subjectivist
criteria are rejected). Unfortunately, we have now reached the least
developed part of the fledgling literature on incommensurability and
05 Cooter & Rappoport, supra note 77, at 512-20, suggest that this was the position
of many economists prior to the emergence of modern welfare economics.
'06 See AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES 59-71 & app. A (1985). The
focus on capabilities, rather than on specific goods, provides at least a partial response
to the difficulty discussed earlier in the text. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
For further discussions of this approach, see QUAL=Y OF LIFE (Martha Nussbaum &
Amartya Sen eds., 1983).
107 See supra text accompanying note 47; see also Keating, supra note 96, at 327
("Since conceptions of the good are diverse and incommensurable, objective valuation
is the best solution to problems of interpersonal choice."). While this passage describes
diverse goods as "incommensurable," it is clear that Keating means only that their
value cannot be measured quantitatively in dollars. On Keating's view, diverse goods
can still be compared, and one or the other can still be ranked on an objective scale. See
id. at 362.
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the law. In the remaining portions of this section, I consider and re-
ject two alternative theories ofjustification that have been developed
in that literature. One theory holds that government decisions must
be justified procedurally, by whatever choice emerges from public de-
liberation or from other democratic institutions. The other holds
that government decisions must be justified by whether they express
the appropriate moral attitudes. For the reasons I discuss, neither of
these positions is persuasive-which suggests that the implications of
incommensurability on the law are still to be discovered.""
3. Deliberative Justifications
Rather than trying to justify an objective set of tradeoffs involving
particular goods or capabilities, we might look for a procedural justi-
fication for government decisions. For example, it might be argued
that, when incommensurable values are at stake, government choices
should be based on whatever choices emerge from rational public de-
liberation, or from some other democratic process. As Richard Pildes
and Elizabeth Anderson have expressed it
Political institutions and decision procedures must create the conditions
out of which, for the first time, a political community can forge for itself
a collective will. Those institutions and procedures specify whose views
will be counted in determining the collective will and define the means




I have no quarrel with the general proposition that public delib-
eration and democratic institutions are good procedures for making
government decisions. As a response to the problem of incommen-
surability, however, this argument simply pushes the problem back to
an earlier stage. That is, if all we can say about government decisions
is that they are justified whenever they emerge from public delibera-
tion and a democratic vote, we still have a question about what the
participants in that deliberation ought to be deliberating about. For
example, if I am a public-spirited voter, I will look to political theory
"8' As Richard Warner has concluded, "[m]y point is not that this problem is un-
solvable. My point is that there is a problem to be solved." Richard Warner, Incommen-
surability as ajuisprudential Puzzle, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 170 (1992).
' Pildes & Anderson, supra note 2, at 2198 (footnotes omitted); see also id at 2179
("[R]ational political preferences can be achieved in the face of plural demands and
perspectives only within institutional settings that create time-, place-, and manner-like
constraints on the expression of types of political preferences. Only preferences that
have been mediated by these institutional settings will be respected by other legisla-
tors....").
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to tell me which proposals to support, and which kinds of arguments
to consider in my deliberations. (If I am instead a selfish voter, I
might consider only arguments relevant to my own self-interest-but
this clearly is not the sort of deliberation that Pildes and Anderson
have in mind.) And if all that political theory can tell me is that I
should support whatever proposal emerges as a result of the demo-
cratic process, I am left with no guidance whatsoever at the delibera-
tion stage.
To put the point more concretely, nothing in the argument so far
provides any reason why it would be wrong for public-spirited voters
to always vote for whichever option ranks highest according to one of
the Kaldor-Hicks criteria, or according to any of the other commen-
surabilist criteria discussed above. Nor has anything yet been said to
show why the deliberation itself should not take the Kaldor-Hicks cri-
teria as its central focus, with citizens debating which option truly
ranks higher in Kaldor-Hicks terms. Thus, before we can reject the
normative relevance of the Kaldor-Hicks criteria (or of any other sin-
gle metric), we need an argument that public-spirited voters ought
not to choose the option that ranks highest in Kaldor-Hicks terms,
and ought instead to deliberate about which option is best justified
according to some other criterion. This, in turn, requires some sub-
stantive normative argument to explain why the other criterion is
normatively superior to the Kaldor-Hicks criteria. But such a substan-
tive argument must come from some other source; it cannot come
from the bare principle of public deliberation.
4. Expressive Justifications
As it is impossible to survey the entire field of normative criteria
that might be thought substantively superior to Kaldor-Hicks-and
since many of these have nothing to do with incommensurability-
I will conclude by discussing a related argument of Elizabeth
Anderson's, that governments should choose options that express the
proper evaluative attitude. As noted earlier, Anderson believes that
individual choices should express proper attitudes toward the objects
of choice, and that selecting the proper attitude may require the rec-
onciliation of several diverse kinds of valuations (thus producing in-
commensurability for purposes of the individual's decision)."o If the
government is, for these purposes, just like an individual, in the sense
"10 SeeANDERSON, supra note 1, at 17-43; see also supra Part III.D.3.
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that it too should make choices that express the proper attitudes, in-
commensurability for an individual decision would automatically
translate into incommensurability for the government.
However, some argument is needed to explain why the govern-
ment ought to be treated like an individual, in the sense of requiring
its choices to express proper attitudes. When discussing individual
action, Anderson derives this requirement from the demands of self-
understanding,"' and it is hardly obvious that self-understanding
should be demanded of governments. To the contrary, by most lib-
eral accounts the government is an inanimate institution, which isjus-
tified (if at all) by what it contributes to its individual citizens.
In any event, even if we accept the premise that government deci-
sions ought to express appropriate attitudes, there is still the problem
of determining which decisions express which attitudes in order to
determine which decisions are ruled out by this premise. Pildes and
Anderson take the Ford Pinto case as a possible example, offering the
following reason for the public outrage over Ford's cost-benefit analy-
sis: "[G]iven the background of social and legal understandings
against which Ford executives had acted, Ford's particular tradeoff
expressed contempt for human life. Other tradeoffs of safety against cost
need not do so.""
2
Pildes and Anderson thus do not claim that social and legal un-
derstandings assign the same contempt to every use of cost-benefit
analysis, or to every analysis that balances safety against financial costs.
But they also do not offer any basis for distinguishing those cost-
benefit analyses that express contempt from those that do not. They
do suggest that part of the outrage in the Ford case was due not to the
cost-benefit analysis itself, but rather to the fact that Ford (having de-
cided to build the Pinto in a certain way) did not disclose the result-
ing risks to consumers.1 3 But Ford's nondisclosure of the risks pre-
sumably would have been problematic even if it had never used a cost-
benefit analysis at all-for example, if it had used some other, morally
acceptable basis for deciding what level of risks to build into the car,
II See ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 17 ("To fully make sense of one's rational con-
cerns, one must be motivated to actually establish the relationship to the object of
one's concern which is implicit in one's attitudes toward it.").
112 Pildes & Anderson, supra note 2, at 2151.
I'- See iU2 (characterizing Ford's nondisclosure as "heightening" the contempt ex-
pressed by the cost-benefit analysis).
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but had still refused to disclose whatever risks remained.1 We are
therefore left with the question of what it is about the cost-benefit
analysis itself (as distinct from the nondisclosure) that gives rise to
Pildes and Anderson's interpretation of it as expressing contempt for
human lives.
Pildes and Anderson may believe that the appropriate interpreta-
tion can be drawn, on a case by case basis, by examination of our
"background of social and legal understandings." 5 In a similar way,
other legal scholars sometimes seem to assume that "social meanings"
are a semiotic sign or code, which-though the proper decoding may
vary from group to group or context to context-can still supply a de-
terminate meaning in any particular context. 16 But this is at best a
controversial view of how meanings work, and one that many linguists
and philosophers of language would dispute."7 An alternative view-
though this, too, is controversial -- is that the meaning of most social
actions, unlike the meanings established by a predefined code, must
be imputed or constructed by a more creative act on the part of the
interpreter, in which the interpreter's own normative beliefs will in-
evitably play an important role. That is, if we already believe that cost-
benefit analysis is unjustified on other grounds, it may then make per-
fect sense to interpret the cost-benefit analysis as expressing an im-
proper attitude. But if we instead believe that the cost-benefit analysis
is justified, we will then have no reason to interpret it as expressing
anything improper. On this view, then, imputing a "meaning" to an
action does not really supply an independent reason for criticizing
that action, but rather restates a normative conclusion that must be
defended on other grounds." 9
'11 Pildes and Anderson clearly do not believe that Ford should have built the car
leaving no risks at all. See id.
115 Id.
116 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 22, at 973-74. Lessig quotes Pierre Bourdieu:
"'(C]ulture... is a common code enabling all those possessing that code to attach
the same meaning to the same words, the same types of behavior and the same
works ... .'" Id. (quoting Pierre Bourdieu, Systems of Education and Systems of Though4 in
READINGS IN THE THEORY OF EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS 159, 162 (Earl Hopper ed., 1971)).
117 For criticisms of the code model, see DAN SPERBER & DEIRDRE WILSON,
RELEVANCE: COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION 1-64 (2d ed. 1995).
1 For citations to the literature on linguistics and the philosophy of language, see
Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW (Jody Kraus & Steven Walt eds., forthcoming 1998)
(manuscript at 18-26, on file with author).
"9 See the analogous argument regarding commodification discussed supra Part
III.E.
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In any event, even if an existing social or legal background does
require us to interpret certain uses of cost-benefit analysis as express-
ing contempt, it is not clear why that existing background should be
taken as given. In other contexts, Anderson recognizes that we are
not limited to whatever set of norms happens to exist in any particu-
lar society, and that we can criticize existing norms and urge their re-
placement with new ones.2 2 Thus, even if she and Pildes are correct
in identifying the social understanding at work in the Pinto case, it
hardly follows that the government must simply accept that under-
standing, rather than arguing for a new interpretive convention. If
their belief is that the existing convention is proper, and that (some)
cost-benefit analysis ought to be interpreted as expressing contempt
for human life, then we are back to an independent normative con-
clusion that must be justified on some other ground. And if their
concern is simply that the government might not be successful in
changing the convention, so many people would continue to inter-
pret the government's cost-benefit analysis as expressing contempt,
then we are back to predictions about the psychological consequences
of government decisions (in other words, we are back to commodifi-
cation). These psychological predictions-though undoubtedly im-
portant-are simply beyond the scope of this Article.
CONCLUSION
I began by asking what implications the incommensurability the-
sis would have (if it were true) for the justification of legal decisions.
Unfortunately, this question is impossible to answer without some
theory of how government decisions ought usually to be justified.
That is, depending on what one believes about how government deci-
sions should usually be justified, the effect of incommensurability
could range from nothing to quite a lot.
In particular, incommensurability will have no effect at all on
those who hold a subjectivist theory of individual welfare, by which I
mean any theory that assesses individual welfare by reference to the
choices that would have been made by the individuals themselves.
Since the incommensurability thesis (in most of its forms) does not
hold that individuals themselves cannot make choices between in-
commensurable goods, a subjectivist can simply take those choices
and use them as the basis for her conclusions about the individuals'
'2 See ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 25. For a similar argument, see Sunstein, supra
note 2, at 792.
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welfare. There are, of course, other problems with a purely subjectiv-
ist approach-for example, the need to define the conditions under
which an individual's choice should be respected (what forms of co-
ercion or imperfect information should be excluded?); the difficulty
of predicting the choice an individual would have made under those
conditions; and the difficulty of reconciling gains to one individual
with losses to another. But these are all well-known difficulties with
subjective welfarist theories, and neither the difficulties nor their pos-
sible resolutions are altered by the presence of incommensurability.
On the other hand, if government decisions must be justified by
something other than the choices of the affected individuals, the in-
commensurability thesis could (if true) have significant implications.
That is, if the government should base its decision on some nonsub-
jectivist criterion, but if our best understanding of the relevant crite-
rion sees certain goods or values as incommensurable, we will not be
able to justify the government's decision unless we have some way of
justifying choices between incommensurable options. Unfortunately,
most of the philosophical writing on this issue has focused on how to
justify an individual's choice between incommensurable options, and
thus has not addressed the problem of justifying a government's
choice. In this Article, I considered some possible theories for gov-
ernment decisions-for example, that certain goods ought to receive
lexical priority, or that the government should make choices that ex-
press appropriate moral attitudes, or that it should simply follow
whichever choice emerges from public deliberation. As each of these
theories seems to me to be flawed, I conclude that the literature on
incommensurability has yet to tell us how government decisions
ought to be altered.
